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Tuberculosis (TB) is an international disease of epidemic
proportions. More than 3 million reported cases occur
worldwide each year (1), and the actual incidence is estimated
to be >10 million cases (2). The World Health Organization
(WHO) has published a global strategy for TB control in the
community (3) and has called on all nations to develop
national TB programs. However, preventing TB in the
hospital is just as critical internationally. This report focuses
on issues related to preventing nosocomial TB in the
international setting.
The High Cost of Prevention
Numerous guidelines for preventing nosocomial TB have
been introduced in the industrialized world. One of the most
authoritative protocols is the guideline formulated by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (4).
Implementing this guideline, however, can be expensive.
Various studies have estimated that the cost of preventing
one case of occupational TB in a hospital, using the CDC
guideline, could run into millions of U.S. dollars (5,6). This
expense is a heavy burden for hospitals and beyond the
capability of many developing countries.
The expense is related to the elaborate demands in the
CDC guideline, which was developed in 1994 specifically for
the United States after a serious resurgence of TB. The
urgency of the matter was summarized succinctly in the 1993
document of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) (7). New TB cases had increased by
18%, reversing an 18-year downward trend. Outbreaks had
occurred in many hospitals, and at least five health-care
workers had died. Under such a cloud, making impeccable
recommendations in spite of high expenses in cost and
manpower seemed reasonable.
The situation can be entirely different in other countries,
and therefore guidelines should be tailored to meet local
needs. This paper discusses the approach needed to formulate
a local TB prevention guideline for hospitals, using a
guideline for public hospitals developed in Hong Kong. The
challenge is to develop a tool that will be effective locally and
yet remain consistent with established scientific principles.
At least four elements are needed for a successful local
program: 1) integrating important principles from existing
guidelines; 2) collecting local epidemiologic data; 3) taking




The first element of a successful local TB prevention
program is to integrate important principles from existing
guidelines. Building on the work of others is critical. The CDC
guideline is an important source, as is a guideline for health-
care facilities formulated by WHO (8).
A useful concept in these guidelines is three levels of
control measures, ordered according to their importance and
priority for implementation: 1) administrative controls,
which are aimed at reducing the TB exposures of health-care
workers; 2) engineering controls, which are environmental
methods to reduce the concentration of droplet nuclei in the
air; and 3) personal respiratory protection for health-care
workers who are exposed to TB in patient care (4). The
protocol we developed in Hong Kong adopted these three
levels as its basic format.
Collecting Local Epidemiologic Data
A second element of a successful local TB prevention
protocol is collection of local epidemiologic data. Accurate
local data on the incidence of TB can be difficult to obtain.
Fortunately, most countries do have case notification data. In
cities like Hong Kong, which have effective TB control
programs, case reports approximate the true incidence of TB
(9).
In Hong Kong, the incidence of TB peaked in 1952, and
BCG vaccine was made mandatory at birth. Subsequently,
the incidence and crude death rate dropped dramatically
(Figure 1). Nevertheless, TB remains endemic in Hong Kong,
with an incidence rate of 1/1,000 population for the past
decade.
Figure 2 shows the antimicrobial drug-resistance rate for
TB strains isolated in the government laboratory in 1998.
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Multidrug-resistant (MDR)-TB is still relatively low, at 1.3%.
One reason may be the effective use of short-course therapy
(five drugs), provided free to the public for the past 20 years.
Finally, we collected data from large, acute-care public
hospitals that participated in the surveillance network of
health-care workers who had nosocomial TB. In Hong Kong,
infection control units are in place in most public hospitals,
and, with the help of the hospital laboratory, staff clinic, and
human resource departments, they regularly identify staff
diagnosed with active TB. Data should be especially accurate
after 1996, when a new law, the Occupational Safety and
Health Ordinance, made reporting of employees with active
TB mandatory. There is also a strong personal incentive for
reporting because the ordinance stipulates compensation for
verified TB cases. The incidence of health-care workers with
active TB was found to be consistently below that of the
general populace, even when the rates were adjusted for the
younger ages of the health-care workers from 1994  (Table).
This trend persisted even after the ordinance was introduced,
making underreporting unlikely.
Surveys of health-care workers to identify tuberculin
skin-test conversions are not conducted in Hong Kong. Such
surveys would not be accurate for detecting active infections
because  BCG is given at birth and repeated if needed in the
school health system. Furthermore, if the incidence of active
TB in health-care workers is clearly below the general
populace and the first prerogative of infection control is
preventing active disease (10), the value of surveys that
identify only immune responses is questionable.
In summary, TB is still endemic in Hong Kong, but the
incidence has been stable for more than a decade. The
percentage of MDR-TB cases is small, and the incidence of
active TB in health-care workers is lower than in the general
population. This low incidence is probably due to a high herd
immunity. The mandatory BCG vaccination with repeated
challenges from a TB-endemic environment and a robust
general health must certainly be contributing factors.
Nevertheless, local data indicate that, unlike the United
States in 1993, no TB crisis confronts Hong Kong.
Emphasizing Local Capabilities and Priorities
The third element in a successful local TB-prevention
program is taking into account local capabilities and
priorities. A guideline for preventing TB in the hospital was
introduced in 1996 in Queen Mary Hospital, the teaching
hospital for the University of Hong Kong. The guideline was
then formally endorsed by the authorities as the reference
guideline for all public hospitals in the territory.
The underlying assumption was that no crisis situation
was at hand in Hong Kong; thus, drastic measures were
probably not required. Nevertheless, best possible practice
within the allocated resources ought to be promoted. The
salient points of this guideline are summarized below.
Administrative Control
Administration control is focused on three sectors of the
hospital: patients, contacts, and staff.
Patients
The first strategy is to minimize hospitalization of TB
patients. Pulmonary TB patients are generally treated as
outpatients in Hong Kong. For those admitted, a 24-hour
laboratory service for sputum microscopy is provided. The
infection control nurse reviews all TB cases diagnosed by the
laboratory (both smears and cultures) and facilitates their
Figure 1. TB notifications and crude death rates, Hong Kong.
Figure 2. Antimicrobial sensitivity of MDR-TB strains from
Government Laboratory, Hong Kong.a
aN = 1,345 (patient specific).
Table. Comparison of tuberculosis in hospital health-care workers (HCWs) and community, Hong Kong
Year
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Hospitals (no.)        3       3          4          7          7          7          7          7
Staff (no.) 9,063 9,063 10,844 17,983 19,555 21,228 21,434 21,863
HCWs with TB (no.)        8       6          9        15          9          8        18        11
Incidence in HCWsa      88     66        83        83        46        38        84        50
Case reports of TB, Hong Kong 6,283 6,292   6,537   6,319    6,212    6,501   7,072   7,673
Incidence, Hong Konga,b    109    112      110 104/90b 101/91b 103/87b 109/94b 115/89b
aper 100,000.
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discharge or transfer to designated TB hospitals. In Queen
Mary Hospital, under such a system, 95% of TB patients are
discharged from the hospital within 4 days of a positive
microbiology report.
An attempt is made to isolate patients with active disease
for 2 weeks, but since facilities are limited, priority is given to
those who are strongly (+++) smear positive, AIDS patients,
and those suspected of having MDR-TB. If isolation cannot be
maintained for 2 weeks, it is maintained for up to 5 days after
effective chemotherapy has begun. Even when isolation is not
possible, exposure of patients to neonates, young children,
and immunocompromised hosts is not permitted for 4 weeks.
Contacts
The admission rates for TB patients in Hong Kong
hospitals are rather high and in Queen Mary Hospital, more
than 200 inpatients are seen each year. In spite of this, the low
incidence of health-care workers with active TB suggests that
the risk of active infection in contacts is not overly high.
Therefore, draconian measures to investigate contacts are not
recommended.
However, when a strongly (+++) smear-positive patient is
seen in a high-risk area (with neutropenic patients or
neonates), a list of contacts in the same cubicle is generated.
Those who have had prolonged contact (>3 weeks) or who have
symptoms suggestive of TB are given a chest X ray. All
contacts of a strongly smear-positive case who are
immunocompromised or children <3 years old are followed up
for 3 months.
Chemoprophylaxis is generally not recommended for
contacts but may be considered for infants who are exposed.
All contacts are counseled to obtain a chest X ray if they
develop symptoms suggestive of pulmonary TB that last for
3 weeks.
Staff
The infection control nurse conducts surveillance for
active TB in health-care workers. Physical therapists are to
avoid chest drainage on patients who are smear positive
unless they are connected to a closed suction system. A
respirator mask is provided for a health-care worker if
intubation is needed for patients who are smear positive.
Some strategies routinely recommended elsewhere were
not included in the Hong Kong guideline. An assessment of
transmission risk at all sites is not conducted. The admission
rate for TB is so high that it seems reasonable to assume that
the frequency of exposure is probably high in most
departments. This high number of admissions also makes
routine education of contacts and staff difficult. The
suggestion of triage and special precautions in departments
such as accident and emergency and radiology was proposed,
but not adopted by the respective departments because they
never had nosocomial TB reported nor encountered
difficulties with their present arrangements. As stated above,
surveys of health-care workers for TST conversion are not
done, nor are surveys of chest X rays or symptoms because
these are reported to be inaccurate (8).
Engineering Controls
Engineering controls are another major point of our
guideline. In hospitals with no central air conditioning, a
specially designed isolation room is not provided. In fact,
WHO has stated that hospitals ought to “maximize natural
ventilation through open windows” (8). Negative-pressure
isolation rooms are usually installed in hospitals with central
air conditioning. The locations of these isolation rooms, as
with the 10 available in Queen Mary Hospital, must be clearly
listed in the guideline for the hospital. The number of
isolation rooms provided is generally insufficient, and
therefore contingency plans with a priority list for isolation
are included as recommendations in the guideline.
Other control measures for proven TB cases are included
in the guideline. Filters are used on ventilated patients and
changed daily. Heat mist exchangers are recommended to
avert frequent tubing change. Finally, for patients in the
intensive care unit, a closed suction system with disposable
suction canisters and tubings is recommended. UV lights and
portable HEPA filters are not recommended in Hong Kong.
Respirator Protection
Respirator protection is another feature of our guideline.
Special N95 masks are provided only for bronchoscopists and
staff with substantial contact (e.g., during intubation) with
patients who have active TB and are not on effective
chemotherapy. For other patient-care activities, only the
surgical mask is recommended. There is no evidence that the
N95 is better than the surgical mask in preventing employee
skin-test conversion in the United States (11). Routine fit
testing and medical screening, as mandated by OSHA in
America (7), are not conducted, as even U.S. specialists have
questioned their benefit (11).
Ongoing Monitoring for Efficacy
The efficacy of the preventive measures should be
monitored. In Hong Kong, this is made possible by the ongoing
surveillance program for TB in health-care workers. Our
guideline was introduced in 1996. Surveillance data in 1997 and
1998 (Table) should offer an evaluation on its effectiveness.
Conclusions
With the resurgence of TB as a global problem, due
attention needs to be given to this disease in the health-care
setting. Although authoritative guidelines for preventing
nosocomial TB are available, each country needs to develop its
own specific protocol because, to be effective, guidelines must
address local issues such as disease patterns and resource
availability. The Hong Kong experience hopefully can be a
model for other hospitals engaged in similar undertakings.
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